Judicial Theater: The Lincoln Assassination Trial
by Jordan P Smith
In an attempt to bring swift justice to those who carried out the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, the U.S. military made hasty decisions and shortsightedly breeched the law of the Union. The need for a nation in mourning to heal and move forward with Reconstruction obscured the Constitution and made for an historic farce.
Eight people (Samuel Arnold, George Atzerodt, David Herold, Samuel Mudd, Michael O’Laughlen, Lewis Payne, Edman Spangler, and Mary Surratt) were charged with “maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously conspiring to kill (Abraham) Lincoln, (Andrew) Johnson, (William) Seward, and (Ulysses) Grant within the military department of Washington, and within the fortified and entrenched lines thereof” (p 316). That the eight were charged is not incredible, nor would many deny that the evidence was sufficient for a trial. However, the law states that a person may only be detained for seventy-two hours without a formal charge, yet in this instance the prisoners were arrested in April and were not charged until their first court appearance on May 10th – well beyond the lawful limit (p 316). More grievous were the conditions the prisoners were forced to endure during their detention:
“The secretary of war held the prisoners under conditions so harsh
and punitive that their guilt was presumed even before charges were
filed, and two months before a military court was ready to announce
its verdict.”
(p 305)
Such conditions included canvas hoods tied so tightly around the neck that, not only was it difficult for the prisoners to breathe, but they were essentially blinded. Each man was shackled with leg irons and handcuffs. Payne had the worst of it as he had a ball and chain affixed to his leg irons (pp 302 – 303). The prisoners were moved from temporary holding on board ironclad ships to the Arsenal. This penitentiary had holding cells that were “damp, drab, and claustrophobic” and situated so as to keep the prisoners from communicating with each other (p 304). Eventually the canvas hoods were replaced with padded head covers, inducing “A steady sweat that coursed down (the) forehead over (the) eyes and nose” (p 324). It would not be until June 10th – a month into the trial – that the prisoners would get relief from wearing the hoods. The exception was Payne. Mary Surratt, the lone woman implicated, was neither shackled nor hooded, but was confined solitarily (p 305). Secretary Stanton’s orders were so harsh that the prisoners remained hooded and unauthorized to speak unless directly addressed. Stanton also wanted measures taken to prevent suicide attempts (p 305). Eventually, “[w]eeks of deprivation in idle monotony began to affect their sanity” (p 306) and during the trial itself, “Payne showed signs of dementia” (p 323). However, after scant examinations by both prosecution and defense physicians, neither side’s doctors would testify that Payne was insane (p 326).
The physical injustices that the prisoners incurred at the Arsenal may have actually been surpassed by the Constitutional injustices they endured. Perhaps the most glaring injustice was the type of trial held. The accused conspirators were tried in a military tribunal rather than in a civil trial by a jury of their peers. Those siding with Stanton on the decision to convene a military tribunal “argued the futility of expecting to find an impartial jury in such a politically divided city” and cited the unlikelihood that a jury would produce a unanimous verdict necessary to convict (p 312). Further, Attorney General James Speed, acting on the behalf of Stanton, asserted that a military tribunal was permissible and, indeed, necessary as Washington D.C. was under martial law and “the assassination had taken place in a time of civil war … with the city guarded by Federal troops” (p 312).
Backlash to Stanton’s decision and Speed’s argument came from Lincoln’s first attorney general, Edward Bates, among others. Bates argued (in vain) that a military tribunal “denie[d] the great, fundamental principle, that ours is a government of law, and that the law is strong enough to rule the people wisely and well” (p 312). Citing the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, proponents for a civil trial pointed to the fact that none of the eight accused “conspirators were in the land or naval forces, nor even in the militia, (so) many believed they had to face trial in a civilian court” (p 313). Even one of the original nine appointed judges for the military proceedings, Cyrus Comstock, questioned the “legitimacy of the court’s jurisdiction.” Comstock was outspoken and subsequently dismissed (p 315). Had Comstock remained tightlipped, he may have been sympathetic to some of the arguments presented by the defense as to the legitimacy of the tribunal.
Comstock’s replacement completed the nine-man military commission that would decide the verdict and fate of the alleged conspirators. Apparently, the “panel appealed to Attorney General Speed for its composition of men taught by experience and habit to maintain coolness and equanimity in the midst of the most exciting scenes” (p 315). This acknowledgment lends itself to the idea that Speed was aware the trial would be an all-out spectacle and a circumvention of the Constitution. The opposition could do nothing to prevent the proceedings – the President, Secretary of War, and Attorney General all gave their blessings to a military tribunal.
The accused were arraigned on May 10th. The first order of business had nothing to do with the actual conspiracy, but rather the objections of General Thomas Harris’ objection to the defense of Surratt by Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson. The two quarreled quite heatedly, but the commission “turned its back on Harris and admitted Johnson” (p 321). Johnson, feeling disrespected by the insults of Harris, refused to represent his client in person for the remainder of the trial (p 321), instead calling on his colleague to act as the trial lawyer. The testimony began two days later. It was a spectacle. Every seat was filled and people were so set on just getting close to the defendants that “they stood on tiptoe to relish the moment and revel in their brush with infamy” (p 318). Spectators spoke quite audibly to one another and souvenir-seekers were stealing parts of the furniture (p 318). The room, being filled to capacity, was stifling hot, which added to the overall discomfort the defense constantly endured (p 319). The trial, initially rumored to be held in secret, was anything but, and the entire world was reading about it (p 338).
William Doster, attorney for Payne and Atzerodt, used a suicide attempt by Payne to form an insanity plea (p 325). The plea did not work, as no physician would declare Payne insane. Doster also counseled George Atzerodt. The defense strategy for Atzerodt was cowardice. Four witnesses testified that Atzerodt was “a constitutional coward” incapable of instigating or joining in on violence (p 335). The defense did not address the charge of conspiracy, which Atzerodt was guilty. He and Payne were sentenced to death by hanging (p 342).
Frederick Stone represented David Herold. Mr. Stone “appealed to the court’s compassion by presenting the young man as a simpleton” (p 328). A doctor with a long history with Herold even testified that Herold had an eleven-year-olds’ mind. Stone’s attempts to make Herold seem the victim of Booth’s coercion failed in the end, and Herold was sentenced to death by hanging (p 342).
Mary Surratt’s defense attorneys were Reverdy Johnson and Frederick Aiken. Aiken replaced Johnson as the trial lawyer after Johnson refused to face General Harris (p, 321). Aiken’s strategy was simple: underscore the fact that all the evidence given against Mrs. Surratt was circumstantial in nature:
“The acquaintance with Booth, the message to Lloyd, the nonrecog-
nition of Payne constituted the sum total of her receiving, entertaining,
harboring, and concealing, aiding, and assisting those named as con-
spirators.”
(p 333)
Aiken also attacked the credibility of Louis Weichman and John Lloyd. He pointed out that Weichmann must be guilty of conspiracy as he simply knew too much for an innocent man (p 333). Discrediting Lloyd’s testimony was an easier task because of the amount of alcohol he consumed the night of the assassination (p 334). Finally, Aiken appealed to the tribunal the consequences of hanging a woman (p 334). In the end, Aiken’s case was not strong enough to save Mary Surratt. She was sentenced to death by hanging (p 342).
Surratt’s fate is the most difficult to fathom. She suffered poor eyesight, which accounts for the nonrecognition of Payne (p 333). She ran a boarding house with any number and type of men coming and going. It was not her duty to know their business anymore than a slave would need to know the business of his or her master. Circumstantial evidence is weak when considering a life – a woman’s life – was in the balance. It was as if the tribunal was content with Mary Surratt taking the place of her fugitive son. At worst, she deserved the same fate as Arnold, Mudd, and O’Laughlin: life imprisonment – a sentence that would later be pardoned by President Andrew Johnson.
Perhaps time was all Johnson needed to cool down and come to terms with the atrocious manner in which the government had acted in detaining, charging, and trying the conspirators. But time was something the convicts were given very little of. Sentenced on a Wednesday, the hangings were scheduled for Friday of the same week (p 344). This gave the defense only forty-eight hours to appeal the verdict. Ultimately, President Johnson would twice deny the request to commute Surratt’s sentence. Immediately after the trial he concluded gender should not be a mitigating factor in determining guilt or innocence (p 343), and a second time he ordered the suspension of a writ of habeas corpus, ensuring Surratt would hang (p 355).
The assassination of Abraham Lincoln was just one part of a dark moment in American history. The assassination was sandwiched between the bloodiest war fought on American soil, and the most negligent dismissal of the Constitution that country has perhaps ever known. It is ironic that the very Constitution Lincoln fought so hard to observe and preserve was cast aside in order to placate the country he helped keep together.
Eight people (Samuel Arnold, George Atzerodt, David Herold, Samuel Mudd, Michael O’Laughlen, Lewis Payne, Edman Spangler, and Mary Surratt) were charged with “maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously conspiring to kill (Abraham) Lincoln, (Andrew) Johnson, (William) Seward, and (Ulysses) Grant within the military department of Washington, and within the fortified and entrenched lines thereof” (p 316). That the eight were charged is not incredible, nor would many deny that the evidence was sufficient for a trial. However, the law states that a person may only be detained for seventy-two hours without a formal charge, yet in this instance the prisoners were arrested in April and were not charged until their first court appearance on May 10th – well beyond the lawful limit (p 316). More grievous were the conditions the prisoners were forced to endure during their detention:
“The secretary of war held the prisoners under conditions so harsh
and punitive that their guilt was presumed even before charges were
filed, and two months before a military court was ready to announce
its verdict.”
(p 305)
Such conditions included canvas hoods tied so tightly around the neck that, not only was it difficult for the prisoners to breathe, but they were essentially blinded. Each man was shackled with leg irons and handcuffs. Payne had the worst of it as he had a ball and chain affixed to his leg irons (pp 302 – 303). The prisoners were moved from temporary holding on board ironclad ships to the Arsenal. This penitentiary had holding cells that were “damp, drab, and claustrophobic” and situated so as to keep the prisoners from communicating with each other (p 304). Eventually the canvas hoods were replaced with padded head covers, inducing “A steady sweat that coursed down (the) forehead over (the) eyes and nose” (p 324). It would not be until June 10th – a month into the trial – that the prisoners would get relief from wearing the hoods. The exception was Payne. Mary Surratt, the lone woman implicated, was neither shackled nor hooded, but was confined solitarily (p 305). Secretary Stanton’s orders were so harsh that the prisoners remained hooded and unauthorized to speak unless directly addressed. Stanton also wanted measures taken to prevent suicide attempts (p 305). Eventually, “[w]eeks of deprivation in idle monotony began to affect their sanity” (p 306) and during the trial itself, “Payne showed signs of dementia” (p 323). However, after scant examinations by both prosecution and defense physicians, neither side’s doctors would testify that Payne was insane (p 326).
The physical injustices that the prisoners incurred at the Arsenal may have actually been surpassed by the Constitutional injustices they endured. Perhaps the most glaring injustice was the type of trial held. The accused conspirators were tried in a military tribunal rather than in a civil trial by a jury of their peers. Those siding with Stanton on the decision to convene a military tribunal “argued the futility of expecting to find an impartial jury in such a politically divided city” and cited the unlikelihood that a jury would produce a unanimous verdict necessary to convict (p 312). Further, Attorney General James Speed, acting on the behalf of Stanton, asserted that a military tribunal was permissible and, indeed, necessary as Washington D.C. was under martial law and “the assassination had taken place in a time of civil war … with the city guarded by Federal troops” (p 312).
Backlash to Stanton’s decision and Speed’s argument came from Lincoln’s first attorney general, Edward Bates, among others. Bates argued (in vain) that a military tribunal “denie[d] the great, fundamental principle, that ours is a government of law, and that the law is strong enough to rule the people wisely and well” (p 312). Citing the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, proponents for a civil trial pointed to the fact that none of the eight accused “conspirators were in the land or naval forces, nor even in the militia, (so) many believed they had to face trial in a civilian court” (p 313). Even one of the original nine appointed judges for the military proceedings, Cyrus Comstock, questioned the “legitimacy of the court’s jurisdiction.” Comstock was outspoken and subsequently dismissed (p 315). Had Comstock remained tightlipped, he may have been sympathetic to some of the arguments presented by the defense as to the legitimacy of the tribunal.
Comstock’s replacement completed the nine-man military commission that would decide the verdict and fate of the alleged conspirators. Apparently, the “panel appealed to Attorney General Speed for its composition of men taught by experience and habit to maintain coolness and equanimity in the midst of the most exciting scenes” (p 315). This acknowledgment lends itself to the idea that Speed was aware the trial would be an all-out spectacle and a circumvention of the Constitution. The opposition could do nothing to prevent the proceedings – the President, Secretary of War, and Attorney General all gave their blessings to a military tribunal.
The accused were arraigned on May 10th. The first order of business had nothing to do with the actual conspiracy, but rather the objections of General Thomas Harris’ objection to the defense of Surratt by Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson. The two quarreled quite heatedly, but the commission “turned its back on Harris and admitted Johnson” (p 321). Johnson, feeling disrespected by the insults of Harris, refused to represent his client in person for the remainder of the trial (p 321), instead calling on his colleague to act as the trial lawyer. The testimony began two days later. It was a spectacle. Every seat was filled and people were so set on just getting close to the defendants that “they stood on tiptoe to relish the moment and revel in their brush with infamy” (p 318). Spectators spoke quite audibly to one another and souvenir-seekers were stealing parts of the furniture (p 318). The room, being filled to capacity, was stifling hot, which added to the overall discomfort the defense constantly endured (p 319). The trial, initially rumored to be held in secret, was anything but, and the entire world was reading about it (p 338).
William Doster, attorney for Payne and Atzerodt, used a suicide attempt by Payne to form an insanity plea (p 325). The plea did not work, as no physician would declare Payne insane. Doster also counseled George Atzerodt. The defense strategy for Atzerodt was cowardice. Four witnesses testified that Atzerodt was “a constitutional coward” incapable of instigating or joining in on violence (p 335). The defense did not address the charge of conspiracy, which Atzerodt was guilty. He and Payne were sentenced to death by hanging (p 342).
Frederick Stone represented David Herold. Mr. Stone “appealed to the court’s compassion by presenting the young man as a simpleton” (p 328). A doctor with a long history with Herold even testified that Herold had an eleven-year-olds’ mind. Stone’s attempts to make Herold seem the victim of Booth’s coercion failed in the end, and Herold was sentenced to death by hanging (p 342).
Mary Surratt’s defense attorneys were Reverdy Johnson and Frederick Aiken. Aiken replaced Johnson as the trial lawyer after Johnson refused to face General Harris (p, 321). Aiken’s strategy was simple: underscore the fact that all the evidence given against Mrs. Surratt was circumstantial in nature:
“The acquaintance with Booth, the message to Lloyd, the nonrecog-
nition of Payne constituted the sum total of her receiving, entertaining,
harboring, and concealing, aiding, and assisting those named as con-
spirators.”
(p 333)
Aiken also attacked the credibility of Louis Weichman and John Lloyd. He pointed out that Weichmann must be guilty of conspiracy as he simply knew too much for an innocent man (p 333). Discrediting Lloyd’s testimony was an easier task because of the amount of alcohol he consumed the night of the assassination (p 334). Finally, Aiken appealed to the tribunal the consequences of hanging a woman (p 334). In the end, Aiken’s case was not strong enough to save Mary Surratt. She was sentenced to death by hanging (p 342).
Surratt’s fate is the most difficult to fathom. She suffered poor eyesight, which accounts for the nonrecognition of Payne (p 333). She ran a boarding house with any number and type of men coming and going. It was not her duty to know their business anymore than a slave would need to know the business of his or her master. Circumstantial evidence is weak when considering a life – a woman’s life – was in the balance. It was as if the tribunal was content with Mary Surratt taking the place of her fugitive son. At worst, she deserved the same fate as Arnold, Mudd, and O’Laughlin: life imprisonment – a sentence that would later be pardoned by President Andrew Johnson.
Perhaps time was all Johnson needed to cool down and come to terms with the atrocious manner in which the government had acted in detaining, charging, and trying the conspirators. But time was something the convicts were given very little of. Sentenced on a Wednesday, the hangings were scheduled for Friday of the same week (p 344). This gave the defense only forty-eight hours to appeal the verdict. Ultimately, President Johnson would twice deny the request to commute Surratt’s sentence. Immediately after the trial he concluded gender should not be a mitigating factor in determining guilt or innocence (p 343), and a second time he ordered the suspension of a writ of habeas corpus, ensuring Surratt would hang (p 355).
The assassination of Abraham Lincoln was just one part of a dark moment in American history. The assassination was sandwiched between the bloodiest war fought on American soil, and the most negligent dismissal of the Constitution that country has perhaps ever known. It is ironic that the very Constitution Lincoln fought so hard to observe and preserve was cast aside in order to placate the country he helped keep together.
Work Cited
Pitch, Anthony. "They Have Killed Papa Dead!": The Road to Ford's Theatre, Abraham Lincoln's Murder, and the Rage for Vengeance. Hanover: Steerforth, 2008. 512. Print.